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Introduction
Public key encryption is the most basic primitive of public key cryptography. However, it suffers from the key distribution and management problem. To overcome this drawback, identity-based encryption (IBE) has been proposed, and it provides a new paradigm for public key encryption [3, 2, 20, 5] . IBE uses the identity string (e.g. emails or IP addresses) of a user as the public key of that user. The sender using an IBE does not need to look up the public keys and the corresponding certificates of the receivers, because the identities together with common public parameters are sufficient for encryption. The private keys of all the users are generated by a private key generator (PKG) which is a fully trusted third party.
Revocation is an essential requirement in a cryptographic system when a user's key is compromised and/or any misuse is noticed. In PKI, revocation is done via certificate revocation lists (CRLs). However, IBE cannot apply this approach since there is no certificate in the system. Boneh and Franklin provided the first practical IBE scheme, and they also proposed a revocation mechanism by appending the timestamp in each identity string, but the workload of updating the private key is linear to the size of the non-revoked users. To address this issues, some practical Revocable IBE (RIBE) schemes have been proposed [1, 11, 15] . Boldyreva et al. [1] proposed the first practical RIBE scheme with the authority's periodic workload to be logarithmic in the number of users while keeping the scheme efficient in both encryption and decryption. However, their RIBE scheme limits the number of users in the system. To overcome this problem, they proposed a method to double the number of users in the system. However, the size of the private key for each user is also increased whenever the size of the system is increased. Some following works [11, 15] have focused on improving the security from selective security to adaptive security.
RIBE schemes are useful in many applications such as email systems and data storage systems by disallowing unauthorised or revoked users to access encrypted sensitive information in those systems. However, in practice it is also possible that two or more IBE systems need to be merged due to various reasons. As an example, a university wants to merge two departments: information technology (IT) and computer science (CS). A naive approach to address this issue is creating a completely new system and re-generating the public parameter and private keys for all users. However, this approach is impractical since a new private key needs to be generated for all the users in the combined system and a secure channel needs to be established between each user and the PKG for key distribution.
In this paper, we propose a new notion called mergeable and revocable identity-based encryption (MRIBE) to solve the above problem. Our scheme inherits the advantage of RIBE schemes by allowing the authority (i.e., PKG) to efficiently revoke users. In addition, our scheme allows different systems to be merged into a single system while keeping the size of the user private key unchanged. Also, there is no secure channel needed for updating the user private keys during the merging process.
Related Work
The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [19] , but the first practical IBE scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [3] and the scheme is proved secure in the random oracle model. Since the random oracle model is an idealised model, Boneh and Boyen [2] proposed a selectively security IBE scheme without random oracles in 2004. One year later, Waters [20] proposed a new IBE scheme with adaptive security in the standard model, but the size of the public parameter depends on the length of the user identity. To reduce the size of the public parameter, Gentry [5] proposed another IBE scheme in the standard model, but its security is based on a non-standard assumption.
RIBE is an extension of IBE by providing an efficient revocation mechanism. The issue of revocation in IBE has been pointed out by Boneh and Franklin in their seminal work [3] . They suggested that users renew their private keys periodically by representing an identity as ID T where ID is the real identity and T is the current time. However, such an approach is inefficient and not scalable because a secure channel between the PKG and each user needs to be established each time, and the workload of generating new private keys is linear in the number of non-revoked users in each revocation epoch. Hanaoka et al. [8] proposed an approach that the users periodically renew their private keys without interacting with the PKG but each user needs to posses a tamper-resistant hardware device. This assumption makes the solution rather impractical. Boldyreva et al. [1] introduced a scalable but selectively secure RIBE by utilizing several techniques including fuzzy identity-based encryption [13] , secret sharing [19] and the tree-based revocation method proposed for broadcast encryption [12, 7, 4, 10, 21] . Libert and Vergnaud [11] proposed the first adaptively secure RIBE scheme. Seo and Emura [15] improved the security model in [1] to prevent decryption key exposure attacks. Lee et al. [9] proposed a RIBE scheme by utilizing subset difference (SD) method instead of the Complete Subtree (CS) method which is used in all previous works. Recently, the techniques used in RIBE have also been extended to achieve revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption (RHIBE) [14, 16, 17 ].
Our Contributions
In this work, we propose a new cryptographic notion named mergeable and revocable identity-based encryption (MRIBE), which is an extension of revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE). The proposed MRIBE scheme inherits all the nice properties of RIBE, in particular the property of allowing efficient revocation, and also allows multiple IBE systems to be merged into a single system, which makes it more versatile in handling the dynamics that could occur in real applications.
We also give a new security model for MRIBE by extending of the security model for RIBE and prove that the proposed scheme is semantically secure in the standard model. Our scheme is based on RIBE by introducing several new algorithms to handle the merging functionality. The proposal scheme also has some several nice features: there is no secure channel needed for key update during the merging process; and the size of user private key remains unchanged when multiple systems are merged, which makes the system scalable.
Paper Organization
Some preliminaries are introduced in the next section. In section 3, we provide definitions for the MRIBE scheme and its security model. We then present our MRIBE construction in section 4. The security proof of the proposed scheme is provided in section 5. Finally, we summarize our result in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notations used in this paper and review the definitions for bilinear map and pseudorandom function family. We also review some cryptographic primitives, including threshold secret sharing scheme, fuzzy identity-based encryption scheme, and revocable identity-based encryption scheme.
Notations
Let N denote the set of all natural numbers, and for n ∈ N, we define [n] := {1, ..., n}. "x ← y" denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from y if y is a finite set, x is output from y if y is a function or an algorithm, or y is assigned to x otherwise. If x and y are strings, then "|x|" denotes the bit-length of x, "x y" denotes the concatenation of x and y. For a finite set S, "|S|" denotes its size and S[i] denotes the i-th value in the set S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then "y ← A(x; r)" denotes that A computes y as output by taking x as input and using r as randomness, and we just write "y ← A(x)" if we do not need to make the randomness used by A explicit. If furthermore O is a function or an algorithm, then "A O " means that A has oracle access to O. A function (k) : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for all positive polynomials p(k) and all sufficiently large k ∈ N, we have (k) < 1/p(k). Throughout this paper, we use the character "k" to denote a security parameter.
Bilinear Map
Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p and g be a generator of G. The map e : G × G → G T is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing if the following properties hold true.
1. Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z p , e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . 2. Non-degeneration: e(g, g) = 1. 3. Computability: it is efficient to compute e(u, v) for any u.v ∈ G.
We say that (G, G T ) are bilinear map groups if there exists a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T as above.
Pseudorandom Function Family
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [6] introduced approaches to constructing random functions in 1984. In this section, we review the definition of pseudorandom function and pseudorandom function family. 
Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir's secret sharing scheme [18] divides a secret s into n pieces s 1 , ..., s n using a unique polynomial of degree (t − 1), any t out of n shares may be used to recover the secret. The details are shown as follow.
Choose a group Z p and p ≥ n. Each user u i is associated with a public unique number u i ∈ Z p and the user set
Each user in U obtains a share s i = p(u i ). When k users come together and form a set J ⊆ U, the secret s can be recovered by utilizing Lagrange coefficient and polynomial interpolation. For
To recover p(x), we have following equation:
Hence, we can recover the secret key s by setting the element x is equal to 0:
Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption Scheme
Sahai and Waters [13] proposed a new type of identity-based encryption scheme called fuzzy identity-based encryption. It is the first attribute-based encryption scheme. There are two schemes, one has to define the universe in the setup phase, and the other one has a large universe. In the large universe construction, it utilizes all elements of Z * p as the universe and defines the following function to cooperate Shamir's secret sharing scheme to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext with J attributes. For x ∈ Z; J ⊂ Z; g, h 1 , ..., h |J| ∈ G, we define
The large universe construction can be used to build revocable identity-based encryption scheme as follows. The private key generation centre issues the private key for every user based on the identity ω and the time t in each revocation epoch for the non-revoked user. The ciphertext is encrypted under the identity ω and time t. So the revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext since they do not have valid time t component.
Identity-Based Encryption with Revocation Scheme
Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar [1] points out that the revocation list can be implemented by the complete subtree method [12] . Since our proposed scheme is mergeable, we slightly modify their revocation scheme. Let x c denote the children of node x. For the root node, it has 2 or more degrees since the mergence, which is differ to the previous work [1] . For the non-root node, it only has two children x l and x r . The detail of revocation algorithm is described as follows.
The function KUNodes takes three parameters as input, a binary tree T, revocation list rl and time t. It outputs a set of nodes, which is the minimal set of nodes in the binary tree T such that the non-revoked nodes have at least one ancestor or themselves in the set and none of revoked nodes in revocation list rl have any ancestor or themselves in the set. The function operates as follows. First it marks all the ancestors of revoked nodes as revoked into the set X, then output all the non-revoked children of revoked nodes in the set Y. Here is a formal specification.
Our scheme is based on the binary tree except the root node has more than two children. After merging, our revocation tree improves the degree of the root node rather than the depth of the binary tree. Let N denote the number of user for each system and N S denote the number of systems. Our tree structure keeps the unchanged size of depth log 2 N . Thus the number of the private key for each user remains unchanged log 2 N . After merging all N S system, the new root node has 2N S degrees. It improves the width N S times compared to the original revocation tree. However, this tree structure does not reduce the efficient since N S is not a significant number and we can re-build the whole system if N S is too large.
Formal Definitions and Security Models

Syntax of Mergeable and Revocable IBE
We start with defining the general syntax of a Mergeable and Revocable IBE scheme. We recall and modify the definition of revocable IBE schemes as defined in [1] . Each algorithm is run by one of following parties -key authority, sender or receiver. The key authority maintains a revocation list rl and state st. We define parameter N S as the number of system in our proposed scheme and use the Greek characters as the subscript to represent the instantiations of different systems in this section and following sections. The stateful Setup algorithm S is run by the key authority. Given a security parameter k, a maximal number of users N and a number of systems N S , it outputs one public parameters pp which shares to all N S systems, and generates a public key pk i , a master secret key msk i , a revocation list rl i and a state st i for each system (i ∈ {1, ..., N S }).
The stateful Private Key Generation algorithm SK is run by the key authority. Given the information of the public key, the master secret key and the state (pk i , msk i , state i ) in system i and an identity ω ∈ I, it outputs private key sk ω,i and an updated state st i .
The Key Update algorithm KU is run by the key authority. Given the information of the public key, the master secret key, the revocation list and state (pk i , msk i , rl i , st i ) in system i and a revocation epoch t ∈ T , it outputs a key update ku t,i .
The Decryption Key Generation algorithm DK is run by the receiver. Given a private key sk ω,i and a key update ku t,i , it outputs decryption key dk ω,t,i or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that ω was revoked.
The Encryption algorithm E is run by the sender. Given a public key pk i in system i and an identity ω ∈ I, an encryption time t ∈ T and a message m ∈ M, it outputs a ciphertext c i . For simplicity and w.l.o.g. we assume that ω and t are efficiently computable from c i .
The Decryption algorithm D is run by the receiver. Given a decryption key dk ω,t,i and a ciphertext c i , it outputs a message m ∈ M or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that the ciphertext is invalid.
The stateful Revocation algorithm R is run by the key authority. Given an identity to be the revoked ω ∈ I, revocation list rl i and state st i in system i and revocation time t ∈ T it outputs updated revocation list rl i .
The stateful Merge Parameter algorithm MP is run by the key authority. Given the public key pk α , the master key msk α , the revocation list rl α and the state st α in system α, the public key pk β , the master key msk β , the revocation list rl β and the state st β in system β, it outputs updated revocation list rl β and state st β .
The Merge Private Key algorithm MSK is run by the key authority. Given the public key pk α , the master key msk α and the state st α in system α, the public key pk β , the master key mk β and the state st β in system β and an identity ω ∈ I, it outputs a mergeable private key sk ω,α,β .
The Private Key Update algorithm SKU is run by the receiver. Given the private key sk ω,α and the mergeable private key sk ω,α,β , it outputs the private key sk ω,β .
Correctness requires that, for any outputs of S, any m ∈ M, ω ∈ I and t ∈ T , all possible states and revocation lists, the following experiments return 1 with probability 1:
-The key authority generates all public parameters for N S systems:
-ω 1 is a valid user in system α:
(sk ω1,α , st α ) ← SK(pk α , msk α , st α , ω 1 ); ku t,α ← KU(pk α , msk α , rl α , st α , t); dk ω1,t,α ← DK(sk ω1,α , ku t,α ); c 1 ← E(pk α , ω 1 , t, m 1 ).
If D(dk ω1,t,α , c 1 ) = m 1 then return 0; else return 1 -ω 2 is a revoked user in system β:
If DK(sk ω2,β , ku t,β ) = ⊥ then return 0; else return 1
-ω 1 is a valid user in system α and merges to system β:
sk ω1,β ← SKU(sk ω1,α , sk ω1,α,β ); dk ω1,t,β ← DK(sk ω1,β , ku t,β ); c 3 ← E(pk β , ω 1 , t, m 3 ).
If D(dk ω1,t,β , c 3 ) = m 3 then return 1; else return 0.
Security of Mergeable and Revocable IBE
We define the selective-mergeable-and-revocable-ID security for mergeable and revocable IBE scheme. Our security model is based on the model for selectiverevocable-ID security defined in [1] .
Definition 4 (sMRID security). Let MRIBE = (S, SK, KU, DK, E, D, R, MP, MSK, SKU) be a mergeable and revocable IBE scheme defined by the security parameter k, the maximum number of user N and the number of systems N S . The adversary first outputs the challenging identity ω * , a challenging time t * and a subscript of challenging public key i * , and also some state information it wants to preserve. Later it is given access to five oracles that correspond to the algorithms of the scheme. The Private Key Generation Oracle O SK (·, ·) takes a public key pk i and an identity ω, runs SK(pk i , msk i , st i , ω) to return the private key sk ω,i . The Revocation Oracle O R (·, ·) takes input an identity ω and a time t and runs R(ω, rl i , st i , t to return the updated revocation list rl i else return ⊥ if the identity ω does not exist in any system.
The Key Update Oracle O KU (·, ·) takes input a public key pk i and a time t and runs KU(pk i , msk i , rl i , st i , t) to return key update ku t,i .
The Merge Parameter Oracle O MP (·, ·) takes input public key pk α and public key pk β and runs MP({pk i , msk i , rl i , st i } i∈{α,β} ) to return updated revocation list rl β and state st β . The parameters of system α are no longer valid.
The Merge Private Key Oracle O MSK (·, ·, ·) takes input an identity ω, a public key pk α and a public key pk β and runs MSK({pk i , msk i , st i } i∈{α,β} , ω) to return the mergeable private key sk ω,α,β else return ⊥ if related MP(·, ·) does not query.
Note that the following conditions must always hold:
1. m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and |m 0 | = |m 1 |. 2. If O SK (·, ·) has been queried on message (pk, ω) then the identity ω has been initialized or merged in the system with the public key pk. 3. O KU (·, ·) and O R (·, ·) can be queried on time which is greater than or equal to the time of all previous queries in each system i.e. the adversary is allowed to query only in a non-decreasing order of time. Also, the oracle O R (·, ·) cannot be queried on time t if O KU (·, ·) was queried on t. 4. If O R (·, ·) has been queried on (ω * , t) for any t ≤ t * then O SK (·, ·) and O MSK (·, ·, ·) can be queried on identity ω * without constrain. Otherwise, O SK (·, ·) and O MSK (·, ·, ·) can be queried on identity ω * but these queries cannot derive the secret key sk ω * ,i * in a trivial way. The details are described as follows.
The relationships between private key generation oracle O SK (·, ·) and merge private key generation oracle O MSK (·, ·, ·) has been described in Fig.1 . Suppose the challenging subscript i * is γ (challenging public key is pk γ ) and the challenging identity ω * is a non-revoked user, the adversary cannot obtain the secret key sk ω,γ and then there are two situations to be considered.
-O SK (pk γ , ω * ) cannot be queried.
-Any queries are equivalent to O SK (pk γ , ω * ) cannot be queried, e.g. if O SK (pk α , ω * ) and O MSK (ω * , pk α , pk β ) have been queried, O MSK (ω * , pk β , pk γ ) cannot be queried since the former two queries are equivalent to the query O SK (pk β , ω * ) and it is trial to gain the private key sk γ by continually querying O MSK (ω * , pk β , pk γ ).
We use two database called D SK and D MSK to record the messages queried to the O SK (ω * , ·) and O MSK (·, ·, ω * ) oracles, respectively. We can decide if the adversary can recover the secret key sk ω * ,i * by checking the database D SK and D MSK . 1. Select bilinear groups (G, p, g) as the public parameter pp which shares to all systems. 2. For i ∈ {1, ..., N S } do the following: (a) Randomly choose (a i , r i ) ← Z * p and set g 1,i ← g ai as well as randomly choose g 2,i , h 1,i , h 2,i , h 3,i ← G. (b) Return public key pk = (g 1,i , g 2,i , h 1,i , h 2,i , h 3,i ), master secret key msk i = (a i , r i ), revocation list rl i = ∅ and state st i = T.
Private Key Generation (sk ω,i , st i ) ← SK(pk i , msk i , st i , ω): given an identity ω ∈ I, a public key pk i , a master key msk i and a state st i . The key authority generates private key sk ω,i for the receiver with identity ω ∈ I and the updated state st. 
Otherwise, set the decryption key dk ω,t,i as ⊥. 2. Return the decryption key dk ω,t,i .
Encryption: c ← E(pk i , ω, t, m): given an identity ω ∈ I, a public key pk i , an encryption time t ∈ T and a message m ∈ M. The sender encrypts the message m ∈ M as follows.
1. Randomly choose z ← Z p and generate ciphertext c 1 , c 2 , c ω , c t . 
Return the message m.
Revocation rl i ← R(ω, rl i , st i , t): given an identity to be revoked ω ∈ I, a revocation list rl i , a state st i and a revocation time t ∈ T . The key authority updates the revocation list rl i as follows:
1. For all nodes v associated with identity ω ∈ I add (v, t) to rl as follows:
2. Return the updated revocation list rl i .
Merge Parameter (rl β , st β ) ← MP({pk i , msk i , rl i , st i } i∈{α,β} ): given all the system parameters {pk i , mk i , rl i , st i } i∈{α,β} from system α and system β. The key authority generates system parameters which bases on the system parameters in the system β as follows:
1. Update the revocation list rl β by uniting two revocation lists rl α and rl β .
2. Update the state st β as follows:
(a) Let T α denote the root node in the binary tree in the system α. Remove the T α in the state st α . The detail of the tree structure list in system α is in Fig.2 .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . fig.3 . Note that the new tree is a binary tree except the root node has more than two children.
3. Return the updated revocation list rl β and the updated state st β .
T β
. . . . . . Fig. 3 . Tree structure revocation list after merging α and β Merge Private Key sk ω,α,β ← MSK({pk i , msk i , st i } i∈{α,β} , ω): given all the system parameters {pk i , mk i , st i } i∈{α,β} from system α and system β and an identity ω ∈ I. The key authority generates the mergeable private key sk ω,α,β .
1. Parse pk i = (g, g 1,i , g 2,i , h 1,i , h 2,i , h 3,i ) and mk i = (a i , r i ) for i = α, β. 2. Generate system parameters a α,β , g 1,α,β , g 2,α,β , h 1,α,β , h 2,α,β , h 3,α,β base on the system parameters from the system α and the system β.
a α,β = a β − a α .g 1,α,β = g 1,β /g 1,α ; g 2,α,β = g 2,β /g 2,α ;
3. For all node x ∈ Path(v) do the following: (a) Compute random values r x,α , r x,β and r x,α,β . r x,α = F rα (ω x); r x,β = F r β (ω x); r x,α,β = r x,β − r x,α .
(b) Let a x,α and a x,β denote the value in node in system α and system β, respectively. If x is the root node in system α. Private Key Update sk ω,β ← SKU(sk ω,α , sk ω,α,β ): Parse sk ω,α as {(i, D i,α , d i,α )} i∈ i andsk ω,α,β as {(j, D j,α,β , d j,α,β } j∈ j for some set of nodes i and j. The receiver generates updated private key sk ω,β as follows.
1. For i ∈ i do the following:
2. Return the private key sk ω,β . 
Security Proof
Return d
Theorem 1. Let G be a prime order bilinear group generator and MRIBE be the associated mergeable and revocable identity-based encryption scheme proposed above. Then for any adversary A attacking sMRID security (defined in Section 3.2) of MRIBE with N users in each system and N S systems, and making q p private key generation queries, q r revocation queries, q k key update generation queries, q m merge parameter queries and q mp merge private key generation queries, there exists an adversary B solving DBDH problem for G such that
Adv smrid−cpa MRIBE,A,N,N S (k) ≤ 4 · Adv dbdh G,B (k) Please refer to Appendix A for the detailed proof.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new variant for Revocalbe Identity Based Encryption. Our proposed scheme allows not only efficient revocation but also efficient merging of multiple systems. Compared with all previous RIBE schemes, our construction does not incur any additional cost. Moreover, the size of the user private key remains unchanged when multiple systems are merged and there is no secure channel required for the purpose of key update during the merging process.
A Security Proof
Proof. The proof is simular to that of [1] , except we meed to handle multiple systems and the mergeable algorithms. We construct an adversary B for the DBDH problem associated with G. B gets (k, G, p, g, X, Y, Z, W ) as input and it has to return a bit d. It is going to use A. For answering oralces, we define the following four functions. For i, j, l, r ∈ Z p , S = {0, j} define
. Setup: B receives the challenging message (k, G, p, g, X, Y, Z, W ) and sets the system parameters as follows.
-B chooses the N, N S ∈ N and sends the security parameter (k, N, N S ) to A.
A generates the challenging identity ω * , the challenging time t * , the subscript of challenging public key i * and the state for some related information about (ω * , t * , i * ), then sends (ω * , t * , i * , state) to B. -B chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and initializes the database D, D SK , D MSK ← ∅, where D is used to record the historical information of the challenging identity ω * , and D SK , D MSK records information of the challenging identity ω * to verify whether to abort. -B simulates the system parameters for all N S systems. B sets public parameter pp = (G, p, g) and randomly picks a value i r ← {1, 2, ..., N S }, where the challenging identity ω * is initialized in the system with public key pk ir . Then, B updates the database D ← ( pk ω * , ω * ), where pk ω * ← pk ω * ∪ {pk ir }. ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N S } then: 1. Randomly pick and store r j , r 1,j , r 2,j ← Z * p in the system j and generate the parameters g 1,j and g 2,j .
2,j g f (i) . 3. Set the public key pk j ← (g, g 1,j , g 2,j , h 1,j , h 2,j , h 3,j ). -B sends the public parameter pp and public keys {pk i } i∈{1,2,...,N S } to A.
-B simulates the revocation list and the binary tree. ∀j = {1, 2, ..., N S } then: let rl j be an empty set and T j be a binary tree with at least N leaf nodes. B picks a leaf node v * from T ir , where the challenging identity ω * is assigned to the leaf v * , and chooses a random bit rev ← {0, 1}, where 0 means ω * is a non-revoked user, otherwise, he is a revoked user.
O SK (pk i , ω): A issues up to q p private key generation queries. B responds to a query on message (pk i , ω) as follows.
O R (ω, t): A issues up to q r revocation queries. B responds to a query on message (ω, t) as follows. If (·, ω) ∈ D, for all leaf nodes v associated with identity ω add (v, t) to reovcation list rl i ← rl i ∪ (v, t), then return rl i else return ⊥. O KU (pk i , t): A issues up to q k key update generation queries. B responds to a query on message (pk i , t) as follows.
-If t = t * , B simulates the key update ku t,i for the system i.
1. If rev = 0, ∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t) then: r x ← Z * p , set E x and d x and update ku t,i ← ku t,i ∪ (x, E x , e x ).
2. If rev = 1, simulate the key ku t depends on the Path(v) and Path(v * ).
(a) ∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t) \ Path(v * )) then: r x ← Z * p , set E x and d x and update ku t,i ← ku t,i ∪ (x, E x , e x ).
-If t = t * , B simulates the key update ku t,i in the challenging time t * for the system i.
1. If rev = 1 and ∀t ≤ t * we have that (ω * , t) ∈ rl i * then abort since challenging identity ω * must be revoked when rev = 1. 2. Else, ∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t) then: r x ← Z * p , set E x and d x and update ku t,i ← ku t,i ∪ (x, E x , e x ).
-Return the key update ku t,i = {(x, E x , e x )} x∈KUNodes(T,rl,t) .
O MP (pk α , pk β ): A issues up to q m merge parameter generation queries. B responds to a query on message (pk α , pk β ) by updating the revocation list rl β , state st β and the database D as follows.
-Update the revocation list and state rl β ← rl α ∪ rl β , st β ← st β ∪ st α \ T α .
-If ω * is involved in the system with pk α , then updating the database D.
∀( pk, ·) ∈ D then set len = | pk|, if pk[len] = pk α , pk ← pk ∪ pk β . -Return the updated revocation list rl β and state st β .
O MSK (ω, pk α , pk β ): A issues up to q mp merge private key generation queries. B responds to a query on message (ω, pk α , pk β ).
-If ω = ω * , B simulates the private key sk ω,α,β for challenging identity ω.
1. If rev = 0, set D MSK ← D MSK ∪ {(pk α , pk β )} and abort if A is able to obtain the secret key sk ω * ,i * by checking the transactions in database D SK and D MSK in Fig.1 .
2. Else set v ← v * . ∀x ∈ Path(v) then: (a) Set r x,α ← G rα (ω x) and r x,β ← F r β (ω x). (b) Set (D x,α,β , d x,α,β ) and update private key sk ω,α,β ← sk ω,α,β ∪ (x, D x,α,β , d x,α,β ), where the union symbol is used to combine the secret keys since this algorithm will return secret keys belong to Path(v). D x,α,β = F 1 (g 2,β , h 1,β , h 2,β , h 3,β , ω, l x,β , r x,β ) F 1 (g 2,α , h 1,α , h 2,α , h 3,α , ω, l x,α , r x,α ) , d x,α,β = F 2 (r x,β ) F 2 (r x,α ) .
-If ω = ω * , B simulates the private key sk ω,α,β for the identity ω. ∀x ∈ Path(v) then: 1. Set r x,α ← G rα (ω x) and r x,β ← G r β (ω x).
2. If rev = 0, set (D x , d x ) and update private key sk ω ← sk ω ∪ (x, D x , d x ), where the union symbol is used for the same reason in previous section. D x,α,β = F 3 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, t * , l x,β , r x,β ) F 3 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, t * , l x,α , r x,α ) , d x,α,β = F 4 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, r x,β ) F 4 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, r x,α ) .
3. If rev = 1, simulate the private key sk ω depends on the Path(v) and Path(v * ). (a) ∀x ∈ (Path(v) \ Path(v * )) then: set (D x , d x ) and update private key sk ω ← sk ω ∪ (x, D x , d x ). D x,α,β = F 3 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, t * , l x,β , r x,β ) F 3 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, t * , l x,α , r x,α ) , d x,α,β = F 4 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, r x,β ) F 4 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, r x,α ) . . D x,α,β = F 3 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, ω * , l x,β , r x,β ) F 3 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, ω * , l x,α , r x,α ) , d x,α,β = F 4 (g 1,β , g 2,β , ω, r x,β ) F 4 (g 1,α , g 2,α , ω, r x,α ) . If any oracles abort, B outputs 1.
Return
A.1 Analysis
Let sreal, srand denote the events that none of the oracles abort in Exp dbdh−real 
